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1 INTRODUCTION 
The inspection of industrial activities is a necessity. 
Mainly it is a question of sustainability – to protect 
the environment and natural resources from damage 
caused by these activities – but it also concerns the 
safety of people, evidenced by the many victims of 
major industrial accidents (Bhopal in India, En-
scheda in the Netherlands, BP Texas City in the 
United States, and AZF in France, etc.). Environ-
mental regulation aims to ensure that industrial ac-
tivities cause the least possible damage. For instance, 
the operators of industrial plants in the European 
Union must comply with Seveso Directive regula-
tions preventing pollution and risks. But it is not 
enough to provide regulations, it is also necessary to 
check that the regulations are correctly applied. In 
France, the risk of pollution caused by certain indus-
trial plants (Installations Classées pour la Protection 
de l’Environnement) means that environmental in-
spectors (Inspection des installations classées) regu-
latory check their compliance with a special juridical 
framework. In cases of non- or partial compliance, 
the French Environmental Code gives inspectors the 
power to impose sanctions: fines and/ or imprison-
ment. In theory, the relationship between the “in-
spector” and the “inspected” (a private or public per-
son, or a business) refers to a person with powers 
similar to those of the police who can punish all 
kinds of non-compliance, and another person con-
sidered to be an “offender”. However, in reality the 
objective of environmental inspectors is not to apply 
sanctions, but to promote economic development, by 
finding solutions that enable compliance with envi-
ronment protection and safety regulations. 
This article shows that environmental inspectors 
negotiate their relationship with the entity they in-
spect, notably since the reform of the Environmental 
Code, which came into effect on 1 July 2013 and 
changed their role. 
The article compares recent sociological studies of 
environmental inspectors, and the current state of 
regulations related to industrial activities in France. 
It gives also some examples from other countries, 
which are similar to the French situation. It address-
es the question of whether safety imperatives can be 
negotiated.  
The methodology consists of a bibliographic review 
of inspection and regulatory compliance, especially 
the sociological and juridical literature. It also exam-
ines the new control procedures contained in the En-
vironmental Code (Articles L 170-1 and following). 
This review is complemented by a study of reports 
prepared by French inspection agencies (available on 
the internet), especially those of the agency in the 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region. Finally, we 
study legal verdicts published on the official French 
website Légifrance, to identify information concern-
ing prosecutions. This search used the keywords: in-
spection, compliance, violation, penalty, warning, 
fine and imprisonment for the period 2000–2013.  
2 INSPECTIONS – IN THEORY 
The objective of an inspection is that an industrial 
plant achieves regulatory compliance with environ-
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mental regulations. Checks are usually carried out by 
the national environmental agency, whose staff are 
experts in their sector: for example, Control of Ma-
jor Accident Hazard (COMAH) regulations are en-
forced by national agencies such as the Environment 
Agency for England and Wales and the Scottish En-
vironment Protection Agency; the Environmental 
Protection Agency in the USA; and the Regional 
Department for Environment, Planning and Housing 
(Direction Régionale de l’Environnement, de 
l’Aménagement et du Logement – DREAL) in 
France.  
DREAL comes under the authority of the local rep-
resentative of the State (the Préfet), and is the com-
petent authority in decisions concerning industrial 
plants (notably permits and administrative sanc-
tions). The agency’s inspectors are engineers, who 
have both a scientific and technical background and 
very good knowledge of the French environmental 
legal framework.  
The procedure for inspections and the powers of 
inspectors are detailed in the Environmental Code, 
supplemented by directives from the Department of 
Ecology. The inspection procedure has changed: first 
in 2006 and then on 1 July 2013, which introduced a 
new mode of inspection, based more on transparency 
and negotiation (see below). 
The inspection is led by environmental inspectors 
and takes place at several key moments in the indus-
trial plant’s history: before activity begins (through 
the assessment of the project proposal put forward 
by the future operator), during active operations, and 
when activity ends and the plant is closed down. At 
each of these times, the objective is to check that the 
plant complies with regulations and does not cause 
disturbance (noise, smell, etc.) or increase risk to the 
neighbourhood. The most interesting period is when 
the plant’s activities may cause several types of 
damage; this is the most important inspection carried 
out by inspectors and the one we focus on in our 
study. 
Generally, environmental legislation gives inspectors 
special powers to check regulatory compliance: they 
can enter an industrial site, grant or withdraw per-
mits, enforce standards and if necessary, prosecute 
the operator of a non-compliant plant (Fineman 
2000). There is a graduated scale of threats and sanc-
tions, ranging from financial penalty notices, com-
pliance notices and restoration notices to criminal 
charges, etc. In France, inspectors are sworn officers 
and this status gives them certain powers. To ob-
struct the work of an inspector is an offense, punish-
able by a fine (€150,000) and imprisonment (six 
months). To check regulatory compliance, inspectors 
may enter the plant at any time. The visit can be re-
quested or unannounced. Most of the unannounced 
visits are due to complaints from neighbourhood res-
idents. Inspectors can access any documents con-
cerning the plant. They can also ask an external ex-
pert for their advice on the level of pollution or risks, 
which must be paid for by the plant’s operator, if 
they consider the documentation to be insufficient or 
incomplete.  
After an inspection, the inspector prepares a re-
port (the lettre de conclusion), in which all the ex-
amples of non-compliance that have been observed 
are recorded. This report forms the basis for a prose-
cution in cases of non-compliance or failure to hold 
a permit. Before beginning a prosecution, the inspec-
tor can ask the Préfet to send a formal notice to the 
operator, which gives them time to rectify any defi-
ciencies. 
In principle, every case of non-compliance can be 
prosecuted, either once the notice’s deadline has ex-
pired or, in serious cases immediately following the 
visit. Two types of sanctions can be applied: admin-
istrative and/ or penal. Administrative sanctions are 
applied if the plant remains non-compliant after the 
notice’s deadline has expired. The objective is to 
make the plant compliant. To that end, the Préfet can 
order that the sums needed to pay for the necessary 
works be deposited (the amount depends on the cost 
of the work to be carried out to achieve compliance); 
have the work done at the operator’s expense; or sus-
pend the plants activity until it is compliant. 
Depending on the offenses committed, criminal 
sanctions can be applied to the operator. They can be 
fined for non-compliance with the applicable legisla-
tion or non-compliance with the formal notice (up to 
€100, 000 and two years of imprisonment). If the 
reason for the non-compliance creates serious dam-
age to the environment, or is a risk to health or safe-
ty, the sanction may be a €75, 000 fine and a year of 
imprisonment. The operator can also be issued with 
a penalty (maximum €3000 per day) until the plant is 
compliant. 
We saw earlier that in France there is a special envi-
ronmental inspection agency that is dedicated to 
monitoring regulatory compliance. In theory, a pros-
ecution can be launched each time an inspector notes 
a case of non-compliance.  
However, does this theoretical scheme correspond 
to reality? Several sociological studies on the subject 
suggest that there are differences between what an 
inspection is supposed to be and what it really is. 
3 INSPECTIONS – IN PRACTICE 
First of all, it is important to note that the overall 
number of inspectors is not enough to monitor all 
industrial plants. No government has sufficient re-
sources to check regulatory compliance in each in-
dustrial plant and to prosecute every failure (Zaelke 
& Higdon 2006). The response to this situation is for 
environmental agencies to target their activities on 
those industrial plants that can cause serious pollu-
tion and damage to people and the environment, and 
those with the worst compliance records (Pedersen 
2013).  
 In France, for example, there are about 500, 000 
Classified Installations (Installations Classées), but 
only 1, 250 full-time inspectors (as of 31 December 
2012). It is clear that it is impossible to check the 
regulatory compliance of every industrial plant. For 
this reason, the plants to be checked are prioritized. 
The Department of Ecology provided a modernized 
inspection program for 2004–2007 and a Strategic 
Inspection Program for 2008–2012. These two pro-
grams outline the methodology to be used in the in-
spection, the organization of inspectors, information 
and training. Based on these programs, each year the 
Department of Ecology decides actions and inspec-
tion priorities. One of these priorities is to check the 
regulatory compliance of the most dangerous or pol-
luting industrial plants.  
 In the United Kingdom, similar priorities are de-
fined: the “risk based approach” reduces the admin-
istrative burden by organizing the work of national 
agencies, especially the Environment Agency. It fo-
cuses on major technological and emergent risks 
(Galland 2008). The same observation can be made 
in Belgium: a natural response to the shortage of re-
sources is targeting, with inspection focused on 
those plants that are suspected to be non-compliant 
with environmental regulations and those that are the 
more dangerous or polluting (Rousseau 2007). 
 
This first observation shows that, due to the lack of 
inspectors, checks of regulatory compliance cannot 
be as rigorous as they should be according to the leg-
islation. Moreover, an indirect consequence of the 
lack of inspectors is to encourage a culture of “mak-
ing arrangements”: the inspector has no choice but to 
trust the operator to be compliant, as there are few 
ways to impose the regulations as they are prescribed 
in the legislation. This is a move away from com-
mand and control methods towards a self-regulatory 
approach (Pedersen 2013).  
The approach to inspections is important as it de-
termines how regulatory compliance is handled. 
French regulations concerning inspections take a 
“safety case” approach (Hale et al. 2002), which 
means that risk prevention is the responsibility of the 
operator of an industrial plant: they have to prove 
that they have identified and assessed the risks, and 
adopted appropriate prevention measures. In brief, 
they have to prove that the plant is safe for people 
and the environment. In this context, the plant, espe-
cially in large industrial groups, is a “self-regulated 
organization”, to which officials can impose sanc-
tions if self-regulation is insufficient (Dupré et al. 
2009).  
Furthermore, the Department of Ecology has di-
rected inspectors to be more tolerant and promote 
industrial development. In 1995, a memo from the 
Department received by environmental inspectors 
confirmed this position: “It is clear that environmen-
tal inspectors must first establish a dialogue with the 
operators of inspected plants. It is not possible to 
prosecute each case of non-compliance” (Bonnaud 
2002). Sometimes, inspectors have a dual role: to 
check regulatory compliance and also to advise the 
operator. This is the consequence of their specific 
technical knowledge, which can be used both to 
check regulatory compliance and to support preven-
tion initiatives taken by operators (Strasser 1996). 
 
This flexibility has an impact on the relationship be-
tween the “inspector” and the “inspected”: inspec-
tors are free to build a cooperative relationship with 
the inspected, and there is room for compromise 
(Ayres & Braithwaite 1991). Consequently, the regu-
latory compliance check is more based on negotia-
tion. Etymologically, the Latin word “negotiation” 
means “trade or commerce”. Specifically, it de-
scribes action to deal with an issue, the award of a 
contract and, by extension, various preliminary oper-
ations that are carried out in order to reach agree-
ment. It also refers to discussions held before a con-
tract is agreed or discussions concerning the 
settlement of a dispute (Cornu 2010). 
In theory, there is no scope for negotiation in an 
administrative procedure that involves the inspection 
of an industrial plant, which may potentially lead to 
a prosecution in cases of non-compliance. However, 
sociological studies of regulatory compliance checks 
at industrial plants show that environmental inspec-
tors negotiate their relationship with the entity they 
inspect. What is very interesting is that this conclu-
sion is found not only in many French studies, but 
also in other countries (Hawkins 1984, Olsen 1992, 
Porter & Van der Linde 1995, Lowe et al. 1997, 
Smith 1997, Fineman 1998, 2000). In general, as 
White observes, “the mandate of most environmen-
tal agencies is not only to enforce compliance 
through use of criminal prosecutions, but to forge 
strategic alliances and working partnerships with in-
dustries, local governments and communities in sup-
port of environmental objectives” (White 2010). In 
the United Kingdom, maintaining a collaborative/ 
negotiative relationship and a constructive dialogue 
with industries is crucial. Inspectors consider that 
without negotiation, the exercise becomes confronta-
tional and while standards can be imposed, it is not 
sure they will be met (Fineman 2000).  
In France, the sociologist Lascoumes carried out 
several surveys in the early 1990s of environmental 
public policies and particularly environmental in-
spections. From his point of view, the purpose of 
environmental policies is not to protect nature (a sac-
rosanct value based on indisputable standards), as 
this would result in a prosecution each time there is 
environmental damage. Instead, his study of policies 
showed that they are more like strategic compromis-
es between conflicting interests (environmental pro-
tection, the development of the industrial economy, 
urban planning, etc.) than real protection measures. 
Policies are more concerned with the modes of the 
relationship between different stakeholders, than the 
results to be achieved. In short, environmental policy 
is not a simple protection policy, but an organiza-
tional policy in which the purpose is to establish 
procedures for resolving problems. In this context, 
the main action principle for environmental inspec-
tors is the regularization of non-compliant industrial 
plants. This regularization is not based on prosecu-
tions, but on negotiation. Of course, the end goal is 
always compliance by industrial plants with the legal 
requirements. However, there are many ways to 
achieve this goal: visits to plants, emails, telephone 
calls, meetings, formal notices; prosecution is the ul-
timate action, which only taken when all other pro-
cedures have failed (Lascoumes 1994).  
 
“Speak softly and carry a big stick” may be said to 
summarize the environmental inspector’s position, 
without forgetting that the big stick can and will be 
used (White 2010). This shows that inspectors have 
an ambivalent role: “enforcer-as-helper” and “prose-
cutor-as-advisor” (Fineman 2000). With respect to 
sanctions, “prosecution ought to be an equal partner 
in the enforcement tool box” (White 2010): sanc-
tions are necessary for the threat to be credible and 
to compel regulatory compliance (Zaelke & Higdon 
2006). However, above all sanctions are an appro-
priate response to a particular set of circumstances 
(White 2010): this flexibility allows the inspector to 
tailor their response to the particular and distinct sit-
uation of each offender (Pedersen 2013). As Eckert 
(2004) notes in the case of Canadian and American 
inspectors, it is common for them to “respond to a 
detected violation by issuing a warning rather than 
prosecuting the violator”. Eckert also noted that in 
cases of the inspection of petroleum storage facili-
ties, the response to most violations has been a warn-
ing, with only a small number of prosecutions or 
fines. In this context, prosecution may be considered 
as a “poisoned chalice”, which is unavoidable 
(Fineman 2000). However, the decision to prosecute 
depends on the size of the company, its previous per-
formance and compliance record, the intent of the 
operator, and their degree of courtesy and respect for 
the inspector (Fineman 2000). Finally, prosecution 
remains a necessary last resort in the most serious 
cases (Pedersen 2013). 
4 CONFIRMATION OF THE NEGOTIATION: 
THE FRENCH INSPECTION PROCEDURE 
In French judicial procedures, the defendant’s rights 
are based on the adversarial principle (the principe 
du contradictoire), which means that both parties in-
volved in a trial knows the arguments of their oppo-
nent.  
In the context of the inspection of industrial 
plants, for many years administrative procedures did 
not provide any opportunity for the operator to be in-
formed about developments and to present their own 
arguments. Prior to 2006, and the entry into law of 
the adversarial principle, the visit report was pre-
pared by the inspector, working alone in their office. 
The plant’s operator had no opportunity to make 
comments or to give their point of view. Moreover, 
the inspector was able to add new elements, which 
were not discussed during the visit. The time be-
tween the visit and the preparation of their conclu-
sions was not clarified. This meant that in the time 
that elapsed between non-compliance being noted in 
the inspection and the formal notice sent by the Pré-
fet, the operator was completely unaware of the sub-
sequent procedures and administrative assessment of 
their case. 
 
Little by little, the adversarial principle found in ju-
dicial procedures has influenced administrative pro-
cedures. In the following, we show that this principle 
forms the basis for a negotiation between the inspec-
tor and the operator of an industrial plant.  
  
The French law that established citizens’ rights in 
their dealings with the administration (12 April 
2000) was the first to establish the principle of nego-
tiation, by providing for “prior consultation” with 
the person who was the subject of a decision taken 
by an administrative authority; in this case the opera-
tor of the industrial plant. 
At that time, the multiannual French environmen-
tal inspection program (2004–2007) had four main 
objectives. Two of them demonstrate the application 
of the adversarial principle: to increase the transpar-
ency of the actions of the inspector and to improve 
the coherency of all decisions taken on French terri-
tory. To achieve these objectives, the program pro-
vided easy access to information concerning the re-
lease of polluting materials, actions taken by the 
inspector to reduce industrial pollution and risks, and 
the results of the inspection, notably through the dif-
fusion of information on the internet. This program 
has increased the visibility of inspection procedures 
and has allowed operators to be better informed of 
the procedures to be followed and how inspectors 
check industrial plants.  
The Strategic Inspection Plan (2008–2012) con-
firmed the right of the general public to have access 
to documents related to industrial plant regulation, 
especially those concerning the inspection visit. The 
2006 modification to Article L 514-5 of the Envi-
ronmental Code officially gives the operator the 
right to be informed of any follow-up subsequent to 
checks by the environmental inspector. The 2013 re-
form of environmental inspection confirmed this 
trend. Consequently, henceforth the adversarial prin-
ciple is applied in post-visit procedures and before a 
formal notice is issued. 
 
Transparency and the adversarial principle lead to 
the institutionalization of negotiations, both immedi-
ately following an inspection, and ex post, during 
prosecution procedures. Inspectors no longer prepare 
their visit report immediately after the inspection. 
First, they prepare a list of issues to be addressed or 
observations. This is written on-site, immediately 
following the visit, during a debriefing meeting. The 
document is signed by the inspectors and the plant’s 
operator. The operator can add their own observa-
tions and comments concerning the list, by mail or e-
mail, within three weeks of the visit. During this 
time they are expected to rectify any deficiencies.  
This shows that the adversarial principle forms the 
basis for the procedure; the preparation of the list is 
the starting point for negotiations between inspectors 
and operators. 
We have surveyed some of these lists, prepared by 
the environmental inspection agency in the Pro-
vence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region (in the south of 
France), which are available on the agency’s web-
site. This study shows that inspectors do not system-
atically demand compliance with the legislation. 
Most of the time, they indicate the issues that must 
be addressed within a certain timescale (usually 
three weeks). After the three-week deadline, the in-
spector updates the list with the following infor-
mation: either the plant is compliant, or a formal no-
tice is needed, or additional environmental measures 
are necessary. Next, they prepare their report (the let-
tre de conclusion), which summarizes the visit, the 
actions that were taken within the three weeks, or 
those which are planned and the time allowed to ap-
ply them. The same document also records any cases 
of previous non-compliance, which makes it possi-
ble to compare situations and see if the operator is 
making an effort to be compliant. The lettre de con-
clusion is send to the operator and can form the basis 
for a future formal notice. 
This shows that the first part of the inspection 
procedure is based on negotiation; the objective is 
not to prosecute, but rather to find pragmatic solu-
tions that address any deficiencies. 
 
What happens in the case of non-compliance within 
the time indicated in the lettre de conclusion? The 
inspector, via the Préfet, can send a formal notice to 
the operator. In this notice, the Préfet reiterates the 
deficiencies that were found and gives a deadline for 
the operator to address them. According to a circular 
from the Department of Ecology (18 June 1998), this 
is a final warning and the deadline cannot exceed 
three months, except in special circumstances. How-
ever, in practice, this deadline is not always met. A 
study of court decisions shows that in some cases, a 
new deadline can be applied, notably when the plant 
is still non-compliant when the initial deadline ex-
pires. Moreover, several further deadlines can be ap-
plied, up to a period of two years (Baucomont & 
Gousset 1994)!  
The second part of the inspection procedure is also 
based on negotiation, and allows the operator more 
time to make the plant compliant, beyond the dead-
line indicated in the legislation.  
 
Since the 2013 reform to the Environmental Code, a 
new form of sanction has been introduced: ”penal 
transaction”. Before prosecution, and as a replace-
ment to it, the Préfet can agree transaction with the 
operator, depending on the circumstances and the se-
riousness of the offense, the nature of the operator 
and its resources. In this case, the Préfet and the op-
erator discuss the amount of the transactional fine 
and the operator’s responsibilities; the idea is to both 
punish the operator and pay for any damages. The 
amount is limited to a third of the initial fine.  
The introduction of penal transaction is final con-
firmation that the objectives of environmental poli-
cies are not to issue sanctions in cases of non-
compliance, but to try to reconcile different interests, 
especially economic. With this kind of sanction 
available, public authorities may become less and 
less strict.  
5 CONCLUSION 
This study shows that the control of industrial plants 
is based on a negotiation between environmental in-
spectors and the operator. The negotiation demon-
strates the real objective of environmental inspec-
tion: to try to reconcile conflicting interests and to 
protect the environment to the greatest extent possi-
ble without hindering the development of industrial 
activities. This leads to a compromise: the objective 
of control is not to prosecute but to find solutions 
that lead to compliance. The recent reform of the 
Environmental Code formalized the negotiation and 
the concept of the inspection. 
What will be interesting in future work will be to 
examine the limit(s) of this concept of negotiation-
based inspection. Are inspectors open to negotiation 
on any topics concerning the environment, including 
issues that relate to personal safety? How far can 
deadlines for compliance be extended? Are there 
some cases of non-compliance that do not need to be 
prosecuted? What criteria should inspectors use to 
determine which cases of non-compliance should be 
prosecuted and those which should not? 
 
In 1994, Pierre Lascoumes was doubtful about the 
limits of this kind of arrangement. Are repeated 
promises of compliance that are indefinitely post-
poned really tenable? 
The answer has recently been given by the French 
administrative court, in the case of the AZF accident 
(Cour Administrative d’Appel de Bordeaux, January 
24, 2013, n° 10BX02880, 10BX02881). The ques-
tion revolved around whether or not environmental 
inspectors could be held responsible for the explo-
sion of the industrial plant. Could it be argued that 
the inspection had failed and that this failure was 
one of the elements that contributed to the explo-
sion? For the judges, the answer was “yes”. They 
noted that the operator had committed numerous 
lapses in the management of the plant, which could 
be considered to be negligent; however, they pointed 
out that the inspection agency also made numerous 
mistakes. The plant was inspected eleven times be-
tween March 1995 and May 2001, without any for-
mal notice being sent to the operator about poor 
management. It appears that the building where the 
explosion happened had never been inspected. The 
operator was never prosecuted, despite obvious and 
persistent failures. The judges noted that the negli-
gence of the inspection agency was particularly seri-
ous, as the plant was located in an urban area, which 
should have justified harsh measures being taken 
against the operator. Consequently, the French State, 
because of the mistakes of the environmental inspec-
tion agency, was considered as responsible of a part 
of the accident. 
The inspection of industrial plants may be based 
on negotiation, but the courts remind us that the ap-
plication of environmental rules can only be negoti-
ated up to a certain limit; and this limit is reached 
when safety is affected. 
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